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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD FOX,-
P~intiff and Res'Po'ndernt, 
... 
-vs.-
J. K. PIERCEY, Chief of the Fire 
Department of Salt Lake City; 
SAL.T LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defe-ndwnts and A:ppellamts. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
75'33 
~STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS EA~CH AND 
EVERY ONE OF THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
II. 
THE LAW APPLICABLE REQUIRES THE CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW MADE BY THE COURT. 
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2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS EACH AND 
EVERY ONE OF·THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The appellants have stated their version of the facts 
at great length, quoting in full many parts of the 
Complaint and Findings and Conclusions. However, the 
statement does not fully r~veal all of the evidence, but 
only such portions as support appellant's contentions. 
It will be noted at the outset that respondent in 
paragraph II of his Amended Complaint sets forth the 
basic coercive forces upon which he relied throughout the 
trial. 'There were three in number. 
(1) That unless plaintiff resigned his position as 
a fireman first grade J. K. Piercey would blast and 
smear respondent in every newspaper in Salt Lake City. 
This the court did not find was substantiated by the 
evidence, and respondent in his testimony did not testify 
that that was what Piercey had said to him. Respondent 
stated that the following occurred (R. 37): 
'' Q. Then what did he say to you~ 
''A. He told me I had to work somewhere; that 
I wasn't going to work there no more, and 
if I didn't resign I was going to he dis-
charged, and I told him I wouldn't resign. 
'' Q. Was there any further conversation be-
tween you and ·Chief Piercey there at his 
office on this morning~ 
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''A. Yes. He told me if I didn't resign he wa.s 
going to blast me and make it n1iserable fo'r 
me to find a job. I told him I wouldn't 
resign.'' 
(2) That Piercey further told respondent he would 
make it so miserable respondent could not secure a job 
in Salt Lake City. Respondent did not testify that Mr. 
Piercey would make it impossible f'Or him to find a job, 
but only that it would be difficult for respondent to find 
employment (R. 40). 
•-'Q. (By Mr. King) lvfr. F·ox, I will ask you, 
what was your primary consideration in 
the signing of this resigna th)n on that oc-
casion, in your mind~ 'Vhat was uppern1ost 
in your mind~ 
"A. I didn't want him to carry out his threats 
on me. 
'' Q. By 'threats' .. what do you mean, 1v.fr. Fox? 
''A. lie said he would blast me and swear me 
all over the newspapers; and if he did, it 
would be difficult in obtaining en1ployment. 
"Q. Did you have any intention at that time, 
Mr. Fox, of resigning your position with 
the Fire Department voluntarily~ 
"A. I did not." 
( 3) That if respondent did not resign his position 
Piercey would discharge him and ~ve him n1ore pub-:-
licity than he ever wanted in his life. There is no dispute 
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on the threat of discharge. Concerning the publicity re-
spondent stated as follows (R. 39') : 
''A. Rather than have Chief Piercey carry out 
his threats, the best thing to do was resifffi, 
and save face with the family. 
'' Q. What did you do, Mr. Fox~ 
"A. I went hack and asked him if it was too 
late to resign. 
''Q. Did you have any other conversation with 
him when you went back~ 
''A. I asked him, if I resigned if he would re-
tract his stories he was going to put in the 
newspapers. 
''Q. What did he say~ 
''A. He says it was too late. He said, if it wasn't 
too late, he would try. '' 
The court in its Findings of Fact found specifically 
In Finding No. 1 that Piercey told respondent unless 
he resigned he would be discharged and the dis-
charge would be accompanied by detrimental publicity 
and would seriously and detrimentally affect r~spond­
ent's opportunity for obtaining employment in Salt Lake 
City and vicinity (R. 24). The court further found that 
the threat by Piercey to respondent alarmed and 
frightened him and while he was under -the influence 
of fear, duress and coercion caused and created by the 
statements of Piercey concerning the detrimental effect 
that a discharge would have upon the respondent's op· 
portunity for employment and the detrimental publicity 
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that 'vould probably result fron1 such discharge, acted 
inYoluntarily and signed the letter of resignation in-
volved in this action (R. 25). 
Respondent's testin1ony standing alone would be 
ample support for all of the Findings of Fact made by 
the Court. But his evidence does not stand alone. It is 
bolstered and corroborated by all of the testimony of the 
·w-itnesses for appellants. Piercey and every one of the 
Assistant Chiefs agreed that prior to his resignation 
Chief Piercey told the plaintiff that it would be better 
for him to resign than to be discharged. Of course, there 
is a Yariance in the testimony concerning just exactly 
what Piercey said. ~Jost of the Assistant Chiefs denied 
that Piercey n1ention_ed ne,vspaper publicity, but it vvould 
seem that this omission was an oversight on the part 
of Piercey for he certainly had newspaper publicity in 
1nind 'vhen respondent 'vas before him and his Assistant 
Chiefs. He had already been contacted by the papers 
concerning a statement on respondent and had released 
the following information to them (Exhibit "D"): 
''PIERCEY OUSTS S. L. FIREMAN 
"A Salt Lake fireman \Vas discharged Fri-
day h~v Fire Chief J. K. Piercey following his 
arrest Thursday night on a_drunkenness charge. 
"Discharged was Harold F·ox, 37, 227 N. 6th 
West. He 'vas arrested at his home :Thursday at 
11 :10 p.m. by police officers. He pleaded innocent 
to a drunkenness charge Friday before Police 
Judge Frank E. Moss, who set triaJ for Aug. 2'6. 
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''Chief Piercey, in a letter Friday to Public 
Safety Commissioner L. C. Romney and the board 
of city commissioners, said he had discharged 
Fox and recommended the commission concur in 
in his action. 
"While the letter was being submitted to the 
city commission, Fox voluntarily sub1nitted his 
resignation to Chief Piercey, \vho said it would be 
accepted. 
"The chief said he talked to Fox in city jail 
Thursday night and Fox admitted drinking and 
striking a wo1nan neighbor. Chief Piercey added 
Fox had been warned and disciplined previously 
for similar conduct." 
Assistant Chief 'Vhite is the only one of the wit-
nesses for appellants who admitted that newsp:aper pub-
licity was discussed with respondent (R. 146): 
''A. The Chief did mention the newspapers had 
called him, that they had the information 
about the evening before and they knew-
he had told them Mr. Fox had been dis-
charged. I believe Mr. Fox asked him if 
it could be stopped, if the newspapers 
couldn't be called and the story stopped. 
I know the Chief made a call to the news-
papers and attempted to stop the story at 
that time.'' 
At the trial Assistant Chief White did not recall 
any discussion of adverse p·ublicity between respondent 
and Piercey until respondent's counsel quoted to him 
part of the record on the Civil S-ervice Commission hear-
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ing. The following questions and answers appear {R. 
147-149): 
'' Q. Mr. White, on the hearing before the Civil 
Service Commission, you stated, did you 
not, that Chief Piercey did tell ~Ir. Fox 
that he vvould have some troubles, though, 
if he didn't resign, getting other employ-
ment, and those troubles would stem from . 
the Fire Department~ 
"A. That vvas his advice to Mr. Fox, that it 
\Vould be harder for him if on the reeord 
of the Department vvas the fact ·he had 
been discharged. If people called, it would 
look much better if there vvas just the 
resignation present. 
"Q. In answer to that question did you make 
the following answer, concerning what 
Chief Piercey had told 1\fr. F·ox : 
'Well, as far as dismissal was concerned, 
that it would be pretty much a matter of pub-
lic knowledge of what \Vent on, especially if 
I-Iarold wanted to fight a discharge, that 
there would be a lot of court action. On the 
other hand, if he would resign, he would be 
spared all that. 
'He 1nade particular reference to the 
fact that Harold vvould have to have work of 
some kind, and as he was seeking a position 
son1where else, these people would call the 
Chief's office for a recommendation, or his 
record on the Fire Departn1ent, that with the 
resignation he \Vould have a clearer case-
that the Chief would simply tell him then he 
had resigned from the Fire Department. 
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'On the other hand, if he was discharged, 
then he would probably have to answer the 
questions as to reason for dismissal.' 
''Do you remember the Chief telling Mr. Fox 
that, Chief \Vhite ~ 
''A. Yes, I think that is right. 
'' Q. In other words, the thing the Chief was 
impressing upon Mr. Fox was, was it not, 
if he resigned he would have a good chance 
of getting employment in Salt Lake City, 
and if he was discharged, he would not~ 
''A. Well, ·he didn't say he would not. 
'' Q. He gave him that impression, didn't he, 
Chief White~ 
"MR. HO;LGR,EN: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion. 
''THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
"Q. (By Mr. King) In answer to the following 
question didn't you make the following 
answer, before the Civil Service Commis-
sion, on this matter: 
'In other words, Chief Piercey told Mr. 
Fox if be resigned, his chances for getting 
employment were much better than if he 
were discharged as a result of the things 
Chief Piercey would have to tell people, 
when they called, regarding Mr. Fox~' 
"D"d 't 1 n you answer that question: 
'Yes, that is right.' 
"A. I did, yes." 
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At many other places in the testimony of the Assist-
ant Chiefs, respondent's story is eorroborated and con-
firmed even though it appears throughout their testi-
mony that they 'vere avoiding assiduously any inference 
that Piercey was using every coercive force which he 
possessed to obtain a resignation fron1 respondent. 
The withdrawal of resp·ondent's resignation occur-
red within two days of the time that it was given and 
no harm could possibly ha,ve been done. to the Fire De-
partment or Salt Lake City by the issuance of a dis-
charge \vhen the resignation was withdra-\vn, yet Piercey 
has steadfastly refused to discharge respondent. The 
only explanation for such a refusal is that admittedly 
there is no cause for discharge. Since there was no law-
ful grounds for discharge the threat of discharge by 
Piercey was wrongful-and unlawful. 
Respondent's record as a fireman was clear of any 
violation of his duties. 'The only criti~ism of respond-
ent's conduct concerned the family difficulties with 
which he \Vas afflicted. No one has ever intimated that 
those personal problems in any vvay affected respond-
ent's proficiency a.s a fireman. 
This court has held that the fact that a ~ireman does 
not live his private personal life in accordance with the 
view of his superiors is not grounds for discharge or 
cause for removal. Thompson v. Civil SerV'ice Com.mis-
sion, 103 Utah 162, 134 P. 2d 188. In the Thomp!SOn case 
the Fire Chief was admittedly guilty of a positive viola-
tion of law (driving on the wrong side of the street 
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while drunk). Here respondent was found not guilty 
of being drunk in his own home. 
The law under the modern VIew of duress and 
coercion is to the effect that the threat need not be such 
as would put a brave man or even a man of ordinary 
firmness in fear. The question for the court to decide 
is subjective, i.e., did the statements and threats put 
respondent in fear and preclude hi1n from exercising his 
free will and judgment~ In deciding that question the 
court should consider the relation of the parties and the 
attendant circumstances. 
His H·onor, of course, realized that respondent \vas 
an inferior subordinate, \vith very little prestige or 
standing in the Fire Department or general community, 
while Piercey was the Chief of the department and an 
influential citiz~n in the community with access to all 
of the newspap:ers in Salt Lake City, and with a great 
many other means of carrying out his \vill and desires. 
This feeling on the part of respondent came ·before the 
court from the following questions and answers (R. 65): 
"Q. Mr. Fox, was there anything other-! think 
you answered a question of Mr. Hohn-
gren's about publishing in the newspaper. 
Was there any other part of what Chief 
Piercey said to you that you were thinking 
about when you went hack and decided to 
resign, other than the publishing in the 
newspaper~ 
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~ • .l\.. I kne'v that him being as influential as he 
'vas, that he could have a great bearing on 
me finding employment. 
'' Q. Had he said anything about that to you in 
the m~orning meeting~ -
''.A.. He told me he \vas going to blast me and 
smear me in every newspaper in Salt Lake 
City.'' 
.A_ great deal of testimony dealt 'vith an incident 
which occurred on January 30th, 1946, and primarily 
coneerned a letter \Yhich respondent signed and which is 
marked Exhibit "1". The testimony concerning that 
letter, 'vhile immaterial on the main question here, illus-
trates the practice of the Fire Department and ~of the 
Assistant Chiefs in o.btainng compliance from inferior 
officers with the Chief's and Assistant Chiefs' wishes. 
In the letter the Assistant Chiefs req:uired respondent 
to sign ther·e is a statement that no duress or coercion 
was used. against respondent to 'Obtain his signature yet, 
everyone that testified adrni tted that they threatened 
respondent vvith immediate discharge unless he signed 
the letter as written. 
A worthwhile civil service system requires that the 
civil servant be free from coercive pressure from his. 
superior officers. The provisions for discharge give 
a1nple protection to the City and the Chief of the Fire 
Department. If the gate is left open for the use of coer-
cive measures by the superior officers every salutary 
purpose 'Of the Civil Service system can be completely 
circurnscri bed. 
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This ·court should not deal with this question as 
one of niceties. The primary purpose of all public 
authority, including this court, should he to completely 
elhnina te any p'Ossibility of the use of coercion and 
duress by the Chief of the Fire D·e·partment on inferior 
officers to obtain their resignations. 
Resignations should he entirely voluntary or they 
should not be allowed to stand. Every witness that was 
present at the · discussion between respondent and 
Piercey states that respondent told Piercey he did 
not wish to resign and would not resign. It was only 
after his free will had been overcome by fear and the 
coercive forces brought to bear by Chief Piercey tha.t 
respondent signed the lette.r of resignation prepared by 
Chief Piercey's secretary. ·Since all agree that respond-
ent signed the letter of resignation against his express 
wishes and desires, the ·only question that can remain 
is, were the threats and coercive forces brought tG bear 
by Piercey sufficient as matter of law to coerce and 
make involuntary the resignation of respondent fro1n the 
Fire Department~ 
The modern view of the law which will be discussed 
under Point· II of this brief is that the measure of the 
legal sufficiency of the threat or coercive influence is 
not an objective standard such as a brave man or a man 
of ordinary firmness, but is a subjective standard nleas-
ured by the influence that the threats and coercive forces 
have on the particular person from whom a·ction was 
being exacted. 
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POINT II. 
THE LAW APPLICABLE REQUIRES THE CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW MADE BY THE COURT. 
'The .Am-erican Law Institute, R.est:atement of the 
Law of Contracts, sets forth a modern definition of 
duress under Sect~ovn 492 of TT ol. 2. 'The definition reads 
as· follows : 
''Duress in the Restatement of this subject 
means 
"(a) any wrongful act of one person that c.oin-
pels a manifestation of apparent assent by 
another to a transaction without his voli-
tion, or 
'' (b) any wrongful threat of one person by 
words or other conduct that induces an-
other to enter into a transaction under 
the influence of such fear as prec.ludes him 
from exercising free will and judgment, 
if the threat was intended or should 
reasonably have been expected to ·operate 
as an inducement.'' 
Anciently the law was that the duress and coercive 
force had to be of such a nature as would make a brave 
or courageous man submit. That rule was modified until 
it required only that the coercfon be such as would cause 
a person of ordinary firmness to submit. The present 
American decisions have abandoned both the brave and 
courageous man and ordinary firmness man standards 
and make the measure of the legal sufficiency of the 
duress a subjective standard. It is only nec.essary that 
the ·coercive forces be sufficient to overcome. the will of 
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the person being subjected to such forces. The courts 
observe that the weaker and more cowardly p-ersons are 
in greater need of protection than the brave, courageous 
and strong individuals who are able to withstand the 
force of coercive pressure. The reasoning behind the 
modern rule has been set down succinctly in the case 
of Ogle v. Freemarn et 1al., 150 ~an. 864, 96 P. 2d 670, 674: 
''This court and many others have shown a 
tendency toward liberality of definition- that is, 
to relax the rigid requirements of the older rule 
concerning duress. It was said in Willian1son, 
Halsell, Frazier Co. v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502, 
505, 94 P. 807, 808, 20 L. R. A., N. S. 484: 'Under 
the modern theory, duress is to be tested, not by 
the nature of the acts or threats, but rather by the 
state of mind of the victim induced by such acts 
and threats.' See 9 R. C. L. 716, 717. Again, the 
old rule, frequently stated was that' duress is that 
degree of constraint or danger, either ac-tually 
inflicted, or threatened and impending, which is 
sufficient in severity or in apprehension to over-
come the mind of a p~erson of ordinary fir1nness.' 
In a carefully considered opinion in the case of 
Riney v. Doll, 116 Kan. 26, 225 P. 1059, this court 
repudiated the proposition that ordinary j1:rn111ess 
of mind should be included in the standard by 
which to test the existence of duress. It force-
fully argued that if a person imposed upon by use 
of threats had a mind of less than 'ordinary firnl-
ness' he was all the more entitled to he protected. 
The court said : 
'' 'The courts no\v generally recognize that 
this definition is inaccurate for at least t'vo speci-
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fie reasons, viz. : First, experience has furnished 
no yardstick by which the firmness of the human 
will can be measured; and, second, even though 
that could be done, one having a weak will is as 
much entitled to the protection of the la:w as 
though his will 'vere of ordinary firmness or of 
extraordinary firmness. When one uses the blud-
geon of duress to break the "\Vill of his adversary 
and thereby gains a wrongful or uncons.cionahle 
advantage, a court will relieve the victim of the 
consequences of the act he 'vas thus forced to per-
form, whether his will be \vea.k, requiring but one 
blow to shatter it, or whether it be of ordinary 
firinness, requiring several, or· whether it be as 
adamant, requiring many.' " 
'The wrongful acts in the present instance consisted 
of threats, both veiled and otherwise of wrongful dis-
charge, persecution and derogatory publicity. 
In subsection g. Sec. 492 of the R.est.atement of the 
Law of C·ont~acts, page 941, the rule is laid down that 
the coercive acts or threats need not be criminal or 
tortious or in violation of any contractual duty if the 
acts coercing a desired affirmation involve an abuse of 
legal remedies or are wrongful in the moral sense and 
cause fear, such acts vitiate the transaction entered into 
because of the fear. There can he no doubt that the 
salient purpos·es to be served hy the Civil Service Act, 
under which our municipal government employees work, 
could be defeated with ease if the dis.charging authority 
can through th·e threat of discharge, persecution or ad-
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verse publicity extract a resignation from an unwilling 
employee. 
Coercion and duress practiced on a civil service 
employee has been before the courts of the United 
States on many occasions. The case which seems to be 
most directly in point here is MpCarthy v. Steinkeltner 
et al., 22·3 Wis. :605, 270 N. W. 551, 557. James William 
1\fcCarthy, the plaintiff, brought his action for a manda-
tory injunction directing the chief engineer of the fire 
department of the city of Milwaukee, and the board 'Of 
fire and police commissioners of that city to permit him 
to withdraw an application theretofore made by him for 
retirement on pension upon his completion of the requi-
site term of service for retirement, and to reinstate hin1 
to the position of assistant chief engineer of the fire 
department of the city, a position whch he occupied at 
the time of the filing of the application. The chief 
threatened that if he did not S'O retire he would demote 
l\1cCarthy from the position he held to the position of 
captain in the department, without preferring any 
charges against him, and without giving him oppor-
tunity for trial before the board on charges preferred, 
and thereby coerced him into applying for retirement. 
The case was ~efore the appellate court on appeal from 
an order sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's com-
plaint. In reversing that order the court set forth the 
facts and the law applicable in the following language: 
''We are also required in passing on the 
sufficiency of the complaint to determine whether 
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it states facts sufficient to excuse the plaintiff 
from the application to retire and receive a pen-
sion which the complaint states he made and 
states was accepted. The plaintiff alleges that 
the application was made because of a demand 
of the chief that he have his application for re-
tirement on file by June 1, 1936:, and because of 
the threat of the chief that if he did not the chief 
would demote him from his position of assistant 
chief to that of captain. That on retirement as 
assistant chief his pension vvould he one-half his 
salary of $270 per month, while if he was demoted 
to the rank of captain his pension ·on retirement 
'vould be based upon a captain's salary of $210 
per month. That the .plaintiff desired to remain· 
in his position of assistant chief and that by ex- · 
perience, age, health, strength, habits, character, 
and ability was competent and qualified so" to 
remain. That on the chief making said threat he 
requested the chief to discharge hiln and file 
charges so that he might have a hearing before 
the board, but the request was refused .. That at 
the time he filed the application he knew the chief 
had theretofore exercised the power of demotion 
and he believed that the chief had such power and 
believed that the -chief would carry out his said 
threat if he did not retire, and so believing wa:s 
coerced against his will into filng s-aid a pplica-
tion. 'That he was soon thereafter informed by 
counsel that the chief did not possess any power 
of demotion. That on being _so informed the 
plaintiff in writing applied on June 4, 1936, to the 
chief and to the board for permis-sion to withdraw 
his application and asked to he reinstated to his 
position of assistant chief, which application and 
request was on file and before the hoard at its 
regular meeting on said June 4. That the applica-
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tion was denied by the board at its meeting on 
July 2. 
''We consider that these allegations bring the 
complaint within the rule respecting duress of 
municipal officers p:rotected by tenure of office 
provisions recently enunciated in the cases of 
Schuh v. City of Waukesha, 220 Wis. 600, 265 
N. W. 699; Van Gilder v. City of Madison (Wis.) 
267 N. W. 25, 105 A. L. R. 244, wherein the court 
relieved members of the police departments of 
the defendent cities from their agreements to 
waive portions of their salaries under threat of 
discharge if they did not do so. An officer is as 
much entitled to pTotection against salary reduc-
tion by unlawful demotion by his chief as by un-
lawful attempts at reduction by other city offi-
cials, and as much entitled to restoration of other 
rights unlawfully attempted to be taken fro1n hin1 
as to re:storation of salary, even though through 
duress he for a short time submitted to those at-
tempts." 
In the case of People ex rel. 0 '·Connor v. H ardirng, 
224 Ill. App. 198, 132 A. L. R .. 976, 977, the relator had 
delivered to the comptroller a resignation of his civil 
service position as chief clerk in the comptroller's office 
under threat that unless he did so charges would be filed 
against him, and 'vith the understanding that such resig-
nation would be accepted and become effective only in 
case of future misconduct, it was held that the relator 
\Vas entitled to reinstate·ment where the comptroller ac-
cepted the resignation several years later, although there 
had been no misconduct on the part of the chief clerk, 
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the court setting forth the P'rinciple applicable, to the 
case at bar in the follnwing language: 
'' * * * 'Relator was given the alternative of 
signing this resignation or having charges filed 
against him. The filing of such charges, whether 
sustained or not, would have subjected him to 
serious embarrassment, inconvenience, and ex-
pense. A resignation under such 'circumstances 
cannot be said to have been given by the party 
resigning of his o'vn free will. Such a resignation 
might have been rep·udiated at any time.' '' 
There can be no dissent from the general principle 
that resignations as well as any contract which has been 
affirmed in response to threats, coerc~on or duress is 
voidable. Ba;rn.ette v. Wells ~a:rg1o Nevada Nat. Book of 
San Fr.ancisco e:t al., 270 U.S. 438, 46 S. Ct. 326; Stat:e 
ex rel. Young v. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 116 N. W. 486; 
Kr,amer v. Police ;Oomr's., 39 Cal. App. 39·6, 179· P. 2lH; 
B01ard of Eduoation v. Rose, ____ Ky. ____ , 147 S.W. (2d) 83, 
132 A. L. R. 569 (See annotation also). 
In Kidd v. St,ate Civil Service Commission (Cal. 
App.), 55 P. 2d 245, 246, the problem p1resented to the 
Civil Service Commission was similar to the case at bar. 
Kidd had resigned and then withdrew his rooognition. 
His immediate sup-erior refused to allow him to resume 
his duties. The holding of the court was that the resig-
nation was obtained hy duress, fraud and coercion was a 
nullity and that the civil servant should be restore'd to 
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his position. The facts in the Kidd case are very close to 
the facts before the court. There the civil servant was 
called into the office of the superintendent and in the 
presence 'Of one Titlow, his resignation was demanded. 
Charges against him were discussed and the servant was 
informed that he would be charged with inefficiency in 
his duties. He then expressed his unwillingness to re-
sign. The superintendent then stated that if he resigned 
he might be reinstated and that he would not stand in his 
way but would join in the request for the civil servant's 
reinstatement. The same advice came from Titlow, who 
was an office m.anager in the hospital in which the civil 
servant worked. The appellant asked time in which to 
think the matter -over and was informed that unless he 
signed a resignation at once he would be dismissed and 
out of civil service for all time. After further discussion 
and an assurance that the appellant would have a right 
to reconsider the resignation before it became effective, 
the appellant signed a resignation, effective as of Oc-
tober 5, 1933. The court specifically found that the ap-
pellant believed the statements of the respondent that 
he would immediately be dis·charged and thereby lose his 
civil service standing unless he signed the resign~tion 
at the time he complied with the demand for his resigna-
tion. When appellant requested a recommendation fron1 
the respondent the recommendation was refused since it 
would be inconsistent with his former act in 1·emoving 
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the appellant. .Lt\ppellant thereupon file'd notice of his 
withdrawal of his re·signation but this withdrawal was 
not recognized and a formal termination of his service 
was made as of October 5th. The court held that the 
resignation was obtained by coercion and duress and 
stated its findings in the following language: 
''Under all these circumstances we are of the 
opinion that appellant's resignation was obtained 
from him under coercion and duress, and that the 
same was not his free and voluntary act. State 
employees holding office under civil service rules 
and regulations are entitled as of right to have 
such rules and regulations relative to their re-
moval from office fairly invoked and applied. 
Garvin v. Chambers, 195 Cal. 212, 232 P. 696." 
It seems obvious that the cases herein cited are in 
substantial agreement with a very salutary public policy. 
If department heads under civil service may, through 
wrongful threats and coercive measures, obtain resig-
nations from subordinate civil servants, they ·can 
through this simple device establish a spoils system of 
their own. The power of the head of a department to 
harrass, annoy and produce intolerable working condi-
tions for his subordinates is unlimited. He can by use 
of his power to coerce resignations arbitrarily and 
capriciously effect the removal from office of any of 
his subordinates. He can defeat entirely the fine pur-
poses of the Civil Service Act and deprive all of his sub-
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ordinate employees of the protection which that Act is 
intended to afford. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
achieved by its decision a substantial measure of justice 
between the parties; that his decision is amply 'SUJ}-
ported by substantial evidence and his conclusions are 
sound as matter of law. This Court should, theref-ore, 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, W ALL.ACE, BLACK, 
ROIBERTS & BLACK 
DWIGH'T L. KING, 
Attorneys for Respo%dent, 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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